We develop a model of a representative professional sports club operating in a league that has the option of adopting one of two different forms of revenue sharing: traditional revenue sharing and central-pool type revenue sharing. To adopt either form of revenue sharing, the league requires that a majority of clubs increase profit with adoption of the plan. We derive necessary conditions for either plan to garner enough support for a majority vote. The likelihood of forming a majority also depends on the conjectures on acquiring talent that clubs possess. Competitive conjectures make revenue sharing more likely, while cartel conjectures make revenue sharing less likely. Empirical results provide evidence in favor of the model for four North American professional sports leagues.
I. INTRODUCTION
The expansion of professional sport has been a hallmark of the latter half of the twentieth century. Professional leagues of baseball, football, basketball, and hockey bear scant resemblance to those same leagues prior to World War II. In North America the sheer scale and daily media coverage of Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Football League (NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA), or the National Hockey League (NHL) today is a testimony to the success of the business.
And successful they have been. For those clubs that have survived, franchise values have increased dramatically. Among major North American sports, in the last decade of the century the value of franchises increased by an average annual rate of 10.7 percent in the NHL to 17.7 percent in the NBA (Quirk and Fort, 1999.) Entry into these leagues has also become expensive.
During the 'nineties, the cheapest expansion into the NHL cost $35.5 million while a new team in the NBA reached a high of nearly $200 million. In the same period the franchise fees grew at an average annual rate of 18.3 percent for the NHL and an impressive 70.2 percent for the NBA (Quirk and Fort, 1999.) Part of the price of rapid growth is increased scrutiny. In North America professional sports leagues share a number of characteristics that distinguish their structure, conduct and performance from any other industry. 1 We take a league as composed of individual firms that maximize their own profits. Each firm does so through local ticket pricing and by selling local broadcasting rights. These firms are members of the league cartel, so they also undertake actions to maximize league profits without jeopardizing their own local profits 2 . The cartel is allowed to sell national broadcasting and merchandising rights with the proceeds divided evenly among the cartel members. The cartel typically enforces a player draft system, revenue sharing and other activities in which all clubs participate. Finally, firms within the cartel cannot be sold or relocated without permission of a majority of the cartel members, nor can new firms join the cartel without a majority vote. These cartel policies clearly are designed to restrict entry of new firms and maintain the profits of the existing firms and the league, but are protected from antitrust legislation by the decision in Federal League vs. Baseball (1922) .
One particular phenomenon that has arisen in the context of leagues is that of revenue sharing. It is a controversial financial tool that is currently used in MLB and the NFL. It is controversial because owners argue that it increases the economic viability of marginal small market clubs that would otherwise fold, and that it also increases parity in play so that large revenue clubs cannot persistently dominate small market clubs on the playing field (Levin et al. (2000) ), while players believe that revenue sharing drives down salaries 3 . The latter assertion may be of interest to fans and has occasioned much professional discussion (El Hodiri and Quirk (1971) , Quirk and Fort (1992, 1995) , Vrooman (1995) , Marburger (1997) , Rascher (1997) and Késenne (2000) are representative papers), but in our view it has more to do with the fairness of play and skips over the broader issue of addressing disparities in revenue. A recent panel established to study the financial health of MLB concluded that "Large and growing revenue disparities exist and are causing problems of chronic competitive imbalance." - Levin et al. (2000) , p. 1 "In recent years, there has been a rapidly accelerating disparity in revenues and, consequently, payrolls between clubs in high and low-revenue markets. There also has been a stronger correlation between club revenues/payrolls and on-field competitiveness in the years since the issue of competitive balance was studied by the Joint Economic Study Committee which issued its report in 1992. -Ibid., p. 12
The report goes on to discuss means by which revenue sharing and other policies can be used to address revenue and payroll disparities, through which disparities in team performance can be affected. In our view, if revenue sharing is profit increasing, economic analysis should reveal the conditions under which this is likely to be the case, and this is the focus of our paper.
II. REVENUE SHARING
In its most simple form, a revenue sharing system requires that the home club gives the visiting club a share of the gate revenue for each game played. We call this "traditional revenue sharing". The share is adjusted periodically with each collective agreement with the players. MLB implemented its new revenue sharing system in a number of phases. For 1996, the hybrid plan was adopted on a 60% basis, i.e. participating clubs received only 60% of the estimated net payment owed from the pool. This remained unchanged until 1998 when the splitpool plan was implemented on an 80% basis. In 2000, the split-pool plan was operating on a 100% basis. Currently MLB's collective agreement with the players has expired, however the intent is to continue with the split-pool plan. The NFL will adopt central-pool revenue sharing at the start of the 2002 season. sharing, some clubs gain and some lose according to a specific condition derived below. As a result, revenue sharing will be adopted if a majority of clubs gain from its use. While revenue sharing is a zero-sum gain for the league, the league may benefit from the consequent reductions in payroll costs that revenue sharing promotes (Quirk and Fort (1995) ). The movement of the NFL and MLB from traditional revenue sharing to central-pool revenue sharing may be profit maximizing in our framework.
III. A MODEL OF REVENUE SHARING
Fundamental work by Quirk and Fort (1992, 1995) followed by Vrooman (1995) , Rascher (1997) , and Késenne (2000) shows that, while revenue sharing has no effect on league parity, it unambiguously raises profit for every team in the league. Although these authors arrive at this result using different assumptions concerning the supply of talent to the teams, in these models, revenue sharing reduces the cost of talent. Winning teams participate in the losing team's losses and consequently reduce the league wide demand for talent. The approach of this paper is to build a more general model of a league to investigate revenue sharing. To keep a tight focus, we do not explicitly address parity, salary caps, utility of winning, and a host of other important issues.
Conjectures play a key role in determining how team owners perceive the supply curve of talent and the subsequent effect of revenue sharing on profit. Quirk and Fort (1995) (3) is obtained. 6 We assume clubs act so as to maximize their own profit. An alternative setup is for clubs to maximize joint profits, such as in Atkinson, Stanley and Tschirhart (1988) . When maximizing national broadcast revenues, apparel revenues and other central fund revenues, a cartel model is appropriate. However, to maximize cartel profit using only gate revenue, as considered here, would require clubs to have the ability to shift attendance demand to the most profitable clubs. It seems unlikely that clubs would have the ability to do this, hence we assume clubs maximize their own profit from gate revenue.
home revenues that team 1 receives when playing the visiting team j in team 1's stadium, R 1j , and the revenues club j receives when team 1 plays in team j's stadium, R j1 . C(.) is the cost function that depends on the level of player talent for each team in the league; in this case, team 1.
League talent enters a production function that determines game attendance for team 1.
Per home-game revenue for team 1, R 1j , is determined by the product of game attendance A 1j and average ticket price P 1 . Attendance depends on the level of talent of the home team, t 1 and the visiting team, t j .
) (
The terms γ 1 and γ 1j represent the return to attendance from home talent and the talent of team j respectively and are assumed to be positive. This approach is similar to Marburger (1997) 7 , but differs from Pallomino and Rigotti (2000) who also add a specific valuation for "closeness" of each contest. Total home-game revenue for team 1 is the sum of all home game revenues as in 2b:
In (2), since t 1 is the talent of the home team 1 and t j is the talent of each visiting club, the γ's measure a linearized return to talent in the form of attendance and are assumed to be positive.
The revenue team 1 generates in team j's stadium when team 1 plays on the road is R j1 .
Total revenue generated by team 1's appearances on the road is the sum of each of the other n-1 club's revenues:
The production functions in (2) and (3) are simplistic in that they assume no crosseffects, i.e. the marginal product of t 1 does not depend on the level of t j and vice-versa. Further, a ceiling on talent and a ceiling on attendance are treated as essentially the same thing. For now we place no ceiling on either although we return to this issue shortly. With a revenue function that is linear in talent, a cost function that is quadratic in talent proves to be a convenient specification.
( )
Maximizing (1) with respect to t 1 , subject to (2), (3) and (4) gives the first order condition
where
is the conjecture of team 1 regarding the reactions through talent acquisition of each of the other clubs, j, to team 1's changes in talent. We assume all clubs possess identical conjectures 8 . The first two large-bracketed terms in (5) give the (conjectured) marginal revenue of team 1. That is, an increase in talent for team 1 raises both its attendance at home and the attendance of its road games as long as z j is not "too" negative. With revenue sharing, team 1 shares the revenue from both sources. The final term is the marginal cost of talent. Solving (5) for the optimal talent for team 1,
The solution for t 1 is more easily manipulated if some of its terms are converted to averages, represented by a bar over the variable(s), by multiplying and dividing by n-1. After all, the owner of team 1 does not really care about the individual game effects on attendance and revenue at the end of the season, rather only the average effect per game. Thus * 1 t may be rewritten as:
Maximizing Profits using Revenue Sharing
To solve for profits as a function of both talent and the degree of revenue sharing, we need to develop an expression for changes in the optimal level of talent as revenue sharing, a, changes. The standard procedure in QF (1992, 1995) , Vrooman (1995) , Marburger (1997) , Rascher (1997) and Késenne (2000) is to differentiate the marginal revenue, the first two terms in (5), with respect to α to determine how marginal revenue shifts with revenue sharing. In the context of their models, the sign of this derivative indicates how revenue sharing affects parity.
Since marginal revenue is also the numerator of (7), we differentiate (7) with respect to α, but not because we are interested in saying something about parity, but because this derivative is useful when the optimized profit function is differentiated
Differentiating (7) with respect to the revenue share, a, retained by the home team yields:
where the "bar" over a variable or set of variables again refers to the mean of the products.
The sign of this derivative is not obvious. If clubs possess Cournot conjectures then z j = 0 for all clubs. If team 1's talent has a larger effect on its own attendance than its road attendance
) then the derivative is positive and marginal revenue shifts down with greater revenue sharing. This is the "normal" case found in the literature and drives the parity invariance result of revenue sharing. That is, an increase in revenue sharing, a lower a, leads to a decrease in talent and no change in parity 9 . Marburger (1997) points out that the derivative could be negative even with Cournot conjectures if the club plays in a small home market. In this case revenue sharing will also move the league towards parity.
If conjectures are competitive then z j = -1 for all clubs. This is equivalent to a talent constraint since it means that team 1 conjectures that the talent it acquires will be entirely at the expense of the other (n-1) teams in the league. The derivative is still positive if
clubs, which is not unreasonable.
Cartel conjectures imply that z j = 1 so that each club matches the acquisition of talent by team 1 per game. Team 1 then anticipates that all other clubs will react to talent acquisition so as to maintain their market shares. The derivative in (8) then depends simply on the difference 9 The decrease in talent will also shift in the demand curve for tickets by reducing attendance.
between the home game marginal revenue for team 1 and the average of the home game marginal revenues for all other home clubs when they play team 1. This could be positive (above) or negative (below) depending on where the home club average revenue lies in the distribution of all average home revenues. However unlikely the cartel conjecture seems, we retain it as illustrative of the range of consequences that conjectures have on revenue sharing outcomes 10 . Our point is that the sign of (8) depends on the magnitudes of the γ's and the nature of the conjectures.
The optimized profit function can be found by substituting (7) into (1) and simplifying by converting some of the terms to averages.
Taking the derivative of (9) with respect to α and requiring that it be negative means that revenue sharing has a positive effect on profit for team 1. This solution implies inequality (10) 
where AR j1 is the average of the per game revenue of the other j clubs when they play team 1 in their own parks, AR 1 is the per game revenue of team 1 in its own park 11 . Utilizing (5) and rearranging, (10) reduces to 10 If all clubs maintain the same talent shares every season, relative attendances and revenues would not be expected to change (given no price changes) and the expectation of league standings would be the same every season. Of course actual results could differ due to differences in revenue and cost conditions. The analysis would be complicated since the derivative in (5) 
The elasticity α η measures the percentage reduction in talent for team 1 (or percentage increase in talent for the visiting team j) in response to a reduction in α. Condition (11) Hence the last term in (12) is a bonus revenue that team 1 receives from greater revenue sharing due to the competitive conjecture in talent. Revenue sharing will be more attractive to clubs whose average home gate revenue is very close to the average home gate revenue for all other j clubs that it plays on the road.
With cartel conjectures in talent, z = 1 for all clubs, the argument is just the reverse of the competitive conjecture case. With greater revenue sharing, the reduction in talent for team 1 is just matched by all other clubs, reducing their home gate revenues. Team 1 would then prefer not to share more in these lower club j revenues. The sign of the last term in (12) is reversed and revenue sharing is less attractive to clubs near the average gate revenue of all other j clubs.
Clubs that operate in large markets (large AR 1 ) will not support revenue sharing. For a league to adopt revenue sharing, condition (11) must hold for a majority of clubs, regardless of the talent conjecture, implying that there must be a non-uniform league distribution for average per game revenues, and thus the values of marginal products of talent. 14 . (11) does not hold, the club would optimally choose α = 1 and keep all of its own revenue. There is no middle ground for the optimal α. Only a bang-bang solution results. If a majority of clubs satisfy (11), revenue sharing will be adopted.
The base case revenue line is drawn in Figure 1 14 Technically the average revenue and value of marginal product of talent would both have to be above or below the league average for each club in addition to the league distributions being uniform. In this case, the vote to adopt revenue sharing could be split 50-50. 15 Since marginal cost falls as α is reduced, we can couch the discussion in terms of revenue rather than profit.
Perverse effects of revenue sharing on talent In the perverse case, greater revenue sharing shifts marginal revenue upward for every club, increasing the demand for talent and raising payroll costs. Clubs who will support revenue sharing play in large home markets and face low marginal talent costs. This would appear to be counter-intuitive based on casual empirical observations of club market size and payroll costs.
Large market clubs tend to have high payroll costs and probably high marginal talent costs, all the while experiencing a larger return from their own talent at home than on the road. A small number of clubs may fit this description, but most would not making the likelihood of majority support for revenue sharing small.
The QF model again The QF (1992 , 1995 Maximizing (1) with respect to t 1 , then solving for the equivalent form of (11) without taking means gives
Since the first term in (13) is of order (n-1) and the second term is of order (n-1) 2 , the sign of (13) is negative and profits always rise with revenue sharing 16 .
Central pool revenue sharing
We assume that a league operates with the straight-pool plan discussed in section 3, however the results are the same for a split-pool plan without the side payments to the poorer clubs. Despite its apparent simplic ity, this form of revenue sharing is much more complicated to model. Profit for team 1 can be expressed as
where ROL is the rest of the league other than team 1 and a bar over a variable means the average over all games and n clubs (where relevant). Converting all revenues to per game averages simplifies the exposition. In (14), the sources of revenue for team 1 have been extracted into separate bracketed components to emphasize the nature of the revenue sharing. The first term is simply the average revenue team 1 earns from its (n-1) home games that it does not contribute to the central fund. The second term is the share of its contributed home revenues to the fund that it will receive back at the end of the season. The third term is the share of central fund revenue that team 1 receives from the revenues of all other clubs. The revenues for each source are given by (15).
16 Suppose (13) is just equal to zero so profits do not change with revenue sharing. Solving for the optimal t 1 then gives
An interesting feature of (14) is the presence of the last bracketed term, which is the share of revenue team 1 receives from the central fund for games that it does not play. In our framework, an expansion franchise adds one more team contributing to the central fund.
Generally the number of games each club plays over a season does not change with expansion, so the contribution of any one pre-expansion club to the central fund is left virtually unchanged, however pre-expansion clubs will receive a larger share payment if the revenues of the expansion club are above the league average. Leagues will always support expansion to large revenue clubs.
Expansion clubs that play in small markets that earn below the league average revenue may still enter the league if the expansion fee can compensate for the loss of share revenue for the existing clubs from the central fund.
The subscript j does not include team 1 while the subscript k does include team 1. Team 1 maximizes its profit in (14) subject to (15) to give the optimal level of talent.
As before, we take the derivative of (16) with respect to α to determine how talent demand changes under revenue sharing.
The sign of (17) will depend on the signs of the γ's and the assumption of the value of the conjecture z. With Cournot conjectures, z = 0 for all clubs and (17) is positive -the "normal"
case. With competitive conjectures (talent constraint), z j = -1 and, assuming the return to home talent is greater than the return to visiting talent, (17) is again positive. The sign of (17) cannot be determined if conjectures are collusive (z j = 1), however it is likely that (17) will be positive if clubs are not too small.
The optimized profit function for team 1 is given by
Maximizing (18) with respect to α gives, after some simplification 
The derivative in (19) must be negative for revenue sharing to improve profit for any club. The first bracketed term in (19) can be simplified utilizing the first-order condition in (16).
Rearranging gives
Condition ( 
IV. THE EVIDENCE
Professional sports clubs can achieve higher profits through revenue sharing if conditions are right. With traditional revenue sharing, a club will experience an increase in profit if condition (11) is the requirement that marginal talent cost decreases more than marginal revenue for clubs that support revenue sharing. Hence the decision to adopt revenue sharing is as much a decision to hold down player salaries as it is to correct inequities in the distribution of club revenues. To gain enough support for central-pool revenue sharing, the distribution of average home revenues must be heavily skewed to the right, so that the league will be composed of a majority of clubs earning below the average for all other clubs in the league. If more clubs satisfy condition (20) than condition (11), then central-pool type revenue sharing will more condition likely be adopted. We present results for the 1990 to 1996 seasons in Table 5 
V. CONCLUSIONS
The basis of the theoretical model developed in this paper is that a club owner will vote to institute some form of revenue sharing if his or her profit increases as a result. We then derive a necessary condition for this to be the case under two different forms of revenue sharing. While striving for parity is another important motivation for revenue sharing that has been discussed in the literature, we abstract from analyzing the effects on parity in our framework.
This paper makes a number of contributions to literature, principally the explicit account of the voting requirement for revenue sharing, and the use of different conjectures on input (talent). The median voter problem with revenue sharing has not been addressed in the literature.
If a majority of club owners satisfy our condition(s), revenue sharing should be adopted by the league. Positive skewness of the league revenue distribution is a necessary condition to obtain a majority voting result and obviously influences the number of clubs that satisfy our condition(s).
Actual revenue distributions for the major North American sports leagues demonstrate marked positive skewness, justifying the use of the voting model. 17 Gate revenues are used in place of local revenues here. In the NFL, the effect of contraction is much more pronounced than in MLB. Table 1 Table 2 Ratio of average home gate revenue to average road gate revenue for NHL. 
